The objects of scientific investigation are quantitative and can be measured from the outside. Like the things that I touch and see, they lie before me in space. Many of the stars are seen at night by our unaided vision, and more through telescopes. Other entities may be reached through the microscope, and those too small for this must be conceived as lying before us in such a way that they might be seen if our eyes were possessed of sufficient power. Science can tell us nothing of the existence of these objects from the inside nor even if they have such an inside. It tells us only of their surface patterns and the sequence of these patterns in time.
gories were quite sufficient. In the end inner existence is simply called a thinking thing, one kind of thing among others. Hume dispensed with this subjective self altogether, and resolved the whole of experience into a set of impressions and ideas.
Kant saw the arbitrariness of this high-handed procedure, and realized that back of the realm of objects there must be a subject of some kind, apprehending it and in some sense making it possible. But he would not grant that this could be the insignificant self of the human person we observe in space and time, for it is only a complex observed object. The subject back of the world is a transcendental self in a noumenal realm beyond experience. The successors of Kant rejected the notion of a noumenal realm, but since they also refused to identify the transcendental subject with the concrete person, they were forced to devise unverifiable hypotheses of a fioating, transcendental subject or spirit with no observable foundation in the world.
When these theories were abandoned for want of evidence, there was a general return to a Humian position, now called positivism, in which the emphasis is on objective data, or to naturalism, in which the emphasis is on non-religious ways of explaining these data, which is supposedly in accord with the spirit of science. In either case, being is identified with what can be envisaged by a detached observer from the outside. Human existence as lived from within is either ignored, or regarded as being so unstable, relative, and "subjective" as to have no cognitive value.
We might summarize this neglect of subjective existence as follows . Classical philosophy held that it could be dealt with as an object of some kind, a complex essence with successive properties and accidents. This turned out to be inadequate. Modern philosophy realized that something was missing and speculated about a transcendental subject beyond the finite person. No one ever thought of studying the finite existence of the human person as lived from within.
Then suddenly, more than a hundred years ago, during the reign of Hegelian philosophy in Europe, a young Danish thinker, Soren Kierkegaard, reflecting on Hegel's claim to have assimilated the whole of Christian life into his system, became aware of this objectivist trend in modern thought, and attacked it with great penetration and originality. There is a great difference between Christian faith as observed from the outside and as lived from within. The former attitude is detached and uncommitted. Its object is a timeless, abstract essence. The latter is passionately concerned and committed. It is not a theory about some abstraction. but a faith in concrete personal existence. This personal 81 faith cannot be included within any conceptual system. To thiok about Christianity is not the same as to exist as a Christian.
But one who is trying to exist in this way has a peculiar inner access to his own existence. He may describe it and contrast it with other modes of existence which are radically opposed. Kierkegaard devoted his keen powers of observation and his great literary talents to this task, embarking on a new exploration of the hitherto neglected region of the so-called "subjective. " This exploration has since borne amazing fruit. Kierkegaard saw that modern thought, by neglecting the "subjective," had really neglected existence, for existence cannot be clearly envisaged from the outside. It can be adequately understood only from within. Feelings like boredom, melancholy, anxiety, and despair cannot be seen and measured. They must first be lived to be grasped as they really are. Our thought tends to lose itself in its object and to forget itself. But if we are really to understand this peculiarly human manifestation of man, we must understand it in relation to the thinker of the thought, as the guiding light of his existence. According to Kierkegaard, by grasping our existence we can understand thought, but by thought alone we shall never understand existence.
In his exploration of the forbidden region of "the subjective" he soon discovered that he was concerned not merely with a tiny individual object but with a world. Human existence is not enclosed within the limits of a physical organism here and now, but projects itself into regions of outer space, into the past, and into the future. To study the human person as he exists from within is to study a whole world as well as the SUbject that in some sense conditions it. The transcendental self is not a floating consciousness with no seat in the world. It is a phase of the existing person which cannot be adequately described by categories which apply to things, but is open to a type of empirical investigation and analysis never seriously attempted before.
In inaugurating this new study, Kierkegaard was also inaugurating a new approach to philosophy which is now called existentialism, and has been manifested in manifold and divergent forms. Both Heidegger and Marcel have repudiated this term because of their wish to dissociate themselves from certain doctrines of Sartre with which it has become associated in France, but as we need a general term to refer to the common features of this new philosophy, we shall continue to employ it-though in a sense much broader than that of Sartre. By existentialism we shall mean a new mode of thought initiated by Kierkegaard which attempts to approach the problem of being by a careful study of personal existence as concretely lived. It differs from classical realism in denying that such existence can be adequately understood by the use of objective categories such as thing, time, and space. It differs from modem idealism in holding that the transcendental self is the human person in the concrete, and that this is open to disciplined empirical study. This new philosophy is still far from being in a finished state. It is too early to expect any complete and rounded doctrine. We shall restrict ourselves primarily to certain insights of Heidegger concerning the structure of human existence which have attracted wide attention and acceptance: the new field conception of human existence, certain central structures of personal life and its limits, and finally the ethical implications of existentialist thought.
According to the naturalist, the human body is a physical object with definite boundaries which is surrounded by other physical objects in geometric space. Private experience occurs within these boundaries, giving us a confused and distorted picture of ourselves and of the real world of science. The existentialists have shown that these views are not supported by the actual evidence. Let us consider them one by one.
A physical object simply lies before us with its various properties as something there, on hand, to be gazed at from a detached point of view. It lies within a geometric space, any point of which is like any other, at various measurable distances from things. But if we look carefully at the objects round about us, we shall find that they are not like this at all. The chairs and tables and windows of this room are implements at hand inviting me to action. They are not just there, but there for something. The book is ready to be opened. The window invites me tu gaze outside. This environing space does not consist of positions each one of which is like any other. It is rather made up of different places, above me on the ceiling, below me on the floor, before me on the table. The things are either in their places, or just lying around. The room is a region oriented with respect to other regions, and this region is not merely the sum of the things that lie within. It has a structure of its own. Thus when I enter the room, I do not first have to count up the separate objects to know where I am. I must first grasp the region as a whole before I can grasp the places of the different implements.
Each region is for something, and points beyond itself to forther regions. Taken together, they point to an ultimate object of care, for the sake of which they all are. This is that ultimate horizon which I call the world, and within which I myself and all the beings I know are now located. What I have called grasping may begin within me, but certainly does not end there. It reaches out to the various regions of my care, and finally to the last horizon of the world itself in which I am. This reaching out is not separate from me, but a necessary part of my being. Throughout the whole of my waking life, I am stretched out into this world-field, approaching or receding from some region of care. My active existence is never locked up within the spatial limits of my body, nor included within a mind-thing, isolated from the world. Wherever I go, my world goes with me. Without a world-field surrounding him, there can be no human person.
A similar correction needs to be made with respect to the naturalistic view of time as a succession of "nows." On this view, the past has no reality of its own. When the past really was, it was a now. But now it is no longer. The future is a not-yet-now. What first occurs is the past, then the present, and last the future.
According to Heidegger, this conception of time involves many misconceptions, not the least of which is the confusion of time with the things that happen in time. These things occur one after the other. But the different phases, or ecstasies, of time (past, present, and future) do not succeed each other in this way. They occur all together as parts of an integral structure of human existence, or not at all. Just as man is stretched out spatially into surrounding regions of care, so human existence, or Dasein as Heidegger calls it, is stretched out temporally into the ecstasies (outstretchings) of time.
What I call the past is not all gone, because it never was all there. In its own time it had its own past, and even more important, its own future which may overlap with my future, and may be now sustained and repeated. As we shall see, it is such sustaining of human purpose and choice that alone gives unity and integrity to our existence. This existence cannot be enclosed within the limits of a physical organism or squeezed within the confines of a specious present. As long as man exists he is unfinished, always stretched out into the past and projected into the future. He can, of course, order his world in different ways. But some world he must have.
This field conception is already beginning to have a profound effect on depth psychology and psychiatry. It used to be held that mentally disturbed patients projected their internal feelings into the surrounding world, and that their accounts of what appeared to be going on around them were, therefore, of little importance. It is now being recognized that our feelings reveal the world to us, and that we are necessarily projected into a world-field. Hence a disturbed patient will necessarily involve a disturbed world. Thus the psychiatrist needs to listen to what the patient tells him of his world. He may be reporting facts quite as genuine as the internal phases of his disorder, and the former may provide important clues to the latter.
It is also being discovered that the human body and its organs are much more than what the surgeon or physician observes from the outside. This body is not merely a physical object to be seen and measured from a detached point of view. It is also a phase of personal existence. As Marcel says, I am my body. I do not merely have it as an instrument.
IT
The establishment of this field conception of human existence by methods of exact empirical description and analysis has profound implications for the understanding of personal life. For example, it is no longer possible to think of "subjective" experience as an inner process or stream running on within the limits of a human organism. This conception has failed to stand up against critical examination. In fact, the traditional concepts of the subjective and the objective have turned out to be so confused and inadequate that they are scrupulously avoided by more careful thinkers such as Heidegger and Marcel. It is impossible to divide our experience into these two separate regions: on the one hand, my inner feelings and thoughts which are private and known directly only by me; and on the other, objective events in the world which are public and accessible to anyone.
Two considerations can be urged against this division. In the first place, there are basic data, like being, which belong in neither of these supposed "regions" but which pervade them both. The world in which I exist is neither exclusively inner nor outer. My "subjective" thoughts and feelings are in the very same world as the revolution of the planets and the explosion of a distant star. In the second place, the most basic of my inner experiences are inextricably united with external "objects" from which they cannot be separated without their own destruction. My private fear is intentionally directed to a !hreateuing object approaching some region of care. If it disappears, my fear goes with it. The human person is never enclosed within a mind-substance. As long as he exists, he is stretched out to the farthest limits of his world.
Human existence is not only stretched out towards impersonal events in the future, present, and past; it is also stretched out towards other persons. A child is not first of all locked up within a substantial container, which may then develop relations to others. In fact, unless it can transmit its private feelings to others, it cannot exist at all. This beingwith-others may occur in many varying modes, but it is a necessary phase of the child's existence which must be manifested in some mode throughout the whole of life. We are not first of all alone, then having relations to others added on to this original aloneness. It is rather that to-be-with-others is an essential aspect of the original being that I have to be. Thus in Heidegger's terminology, being alone is a privative or special mode of that being-with-others which always, in some form or other, belongs to my being-in-the-world.
In the light of this new empiricism, it is impossible to hold any longer that feelings are states inside the living organism. As we have already noted, a feeling like fear stretches out intentionally beyond the body to make us aware of external dangers. Sensory feelings, like touch and sight, are also intentional in structure. But it has now become clear that these intentional modes of apprehension with definite objects are not the most elemental and primitive forms of consciousness, as has long been maintained by the British "empiricists" and their modem followers. As a matter of fact, they are a highly specialized and late development. They arise from those more undifferentiated types of awareness which we call moods and sentiments.
These elemental modes of feeling are not intentionally directed to a specific object. But they are certainly not confined to what is within the body. They provide us with a dim and flickering light in which we grasp the world as a whole, and how it goes with us. It is from this global awareness that our more clearly focused apprehensions take their origin, and to which they return. Feeling reveals the bare facticity of my being in the world as I already am. It is blind to my own pure possibilities and those of other things.
These possibilities are revealed by what we call understanding. Heidegger draws this distinction very sharply in his influential work, Sein und Zeit. But after making it, he points out that the two are never sharply separated in our adult, waking life. Human facticity must not be confused with an objective fact that is simply all there, as what it is. Since we are always projected into the future, our existence is never all there. Feeling, therefore, always includes an element of futurity. A future project on the other hand, if it is not a mere wish or a daydream, must take account of the past that I am, and have been. Hence al thought has a background of feeling.
It is clear that the living body is involved in feeling, and that feelin! is involved in what we call thought. Even our common sense languag' has now been deeply influenced by Cartesian dualism which looks upor the mind and the body as two separate things, and disregards th' existence in which these diverse levels are held together. In order te describe them as they appear in the concrete, a new language must b, forged. Our experience does not come to us neatly divided into atomistic units or impressions a la Hume. Our being is not so much a being· enclosed-within as a dynamic being-to.
In order to convey an accurate sense of this complex relational struc· ture, hyphenated phrases lilce being-in-the-world, being-at-hand-for-, and being-with-must be used. Sometimes this terminology, so characteristic of the existential literature, seems artificial and tortuous. Certainly it has not yet settled into any well-established and generally accepted forms. If we get beyond the words and stretch out our thought to the actual phenomena, we may begin to see that this is not so much a perverse verbalism as a creative struggle of mind and word to lift vast ranges of personal being into the light of free reflection and communication.
My body is not a thing from which I am separated. It is not even an instrument, for it is the necessary condition for the existence of any instruments. It is a part of me, a level of my being. Nevertheless there are other levels, lilce thought and choice, which are quite distinct and yet I am one person. If I say 1 am mind, I leave out the body. If I say 1 am body, I leave out the mind. If I follow Descartes in saying 1 am both, I cut myself in two. Is it not clear that we are fumbling for a more basic concept, neither mind nor matter but broad enough to include both levels? Being is precisely such a concept, long reduced in our modern languages to a semi-dormant state. If we are to understand the unity of the human person, we must revive this "obvious" concept, and put it to new uses. Thus in his penetrating discussion of the mind-body problem in the Mystery of Being, Marcel refers to the active being of the human person who incarnates himself in his body, and who lives it.
Of central importance for the understanding of personal existence is anxiety. The peculiar quality of anxious feeling was recognized in the classic literature of Christianity. In modem times, however, it has been neglected and ignored. Descartes, for example, does not even mention it in his treatise on the Passions of the Soul. Most of us are now aware that it has some importance for abnormal psychology, but we regard it as a morbid symptom of some kind which certainly plays no major role in normal life. Kierkegaard was the first modern thinker who recognized this strange phenomenon, and challenged the prevailing invidious interpretation. He is followed in this by the existentialists of our time who all agree on the importance of the rOle which it plays in human existence. There are, of course, many different interpretations, but that given by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit is now the most carefully thought out and widely accepted.
Like Kierkegaard, he works out his conception of anxiety by contrasting it with fear, from which it differs in two basic respects. In the case of fear, I am afraid of some definite object approaching me because of its threat to some project or active phase of my being. The of which is always different from the because of which. Thus I am afraid of such and such an eye-disease because of my research. In the case of anxiety, no such difference is ohserved. If we question a really anxious person as to precisely what it is he is anxious about, he will say: "I don't know, really nothing." If we ask him why? Because of what is he anxious?-we elicit the same reply. What does it mean? What is this nothing?
According to the existentialist view, the answer means the very opposite of what it seems to say. In our everyday life, we are for the most part lost in the things we do, the functions we perform. Thus we say he is a lawyer or a doctor; she is a teacher or a nurse. These functions are interchangeable, and can be performed by others. In personal existence, however, there is something unique and irreplaceable, which goes deeper than this. This existence can be totally grasped only in the final perspective of my death. It is the whole of my being-in-the-world that I am anxious about, for the sake of this being itself as it might be, if its last possibilities were fully maintained up to the very end. This existence of mine is not just the functions I perform. It is not any of the things that I do. It is precisely no-thing. The answer is correct.
The definite things that I fear may be strong and dangerous. But precautions may be taken; measures may be adopted to ward them off. Such dangers are usually shared by others. Even if not, they may give us advice and active assistance. The object of anxiety is nothing at all of this sort. It is now my very being that is at stake, not the various functions that might be done by others, but what I alone can do on my own responsihility, not this or that phase of my being, not the next ten days, or the next ten years, but the whole of my being-to-the-end. Is my factual being-in-the-world as I am now, the real being that I have to be? Such anxious questions as this cannot be answered by any resort to technological instruments. No calculating machine can answe, them. No other can answer them for me. They may, however, be evaded I may run away from my anxiety when it begins to encircle me. I rna) discard it as a morbid delusion, deciding to be sensible, and to go aboUi my business. Here too I must face risks. But these are no longer a mist) nothingness, but definite dangers against which definite precautions rna) be taken. This depersonalization of existence is in fact the easier way. Hence we may be able to glimpse what Heidegger means by his state· ment that the impersonal one of everyday life (dos Man) is constantl) evading his anxiety, and attempting to replace it by derived forms of fear.
This strange feeling singles out the person by himself alone. Like death, it is something that I must face alone. It also brings me before those last possibilities of my total existence which elicit final choice. Hence Kierkegaard said that anxiety was the gateway to human freedom. As soon as we pass through this gateway, we are confronted with the mysterious phenomenon of conscience, of which Heidegger has also presented a very penetrating analysis.
We now tend to picture conscience by the image of a courtroom scene in which, after a guilty action, I am called before a stern judge who passes a severe sentence by reference to fixed rules. According to Heidegger, this is a distorted picture which fails to do justice to the actual phenomenon in several important respects. It does not explain why we speak of conscience as "a distant voice" or "call," nor why we refer to "the goads and pricks" of conscience. These expressions would seem to suggest a summons to future action rather than an ex post facto judgment on acts already performed. The threat of conscience is not restricted to certain specific acts. It penetrates to the depths of our being, and threatens our rules and norms as well. How then is it to be interpreted? Heidegger's existential analysis of man enables him to answer this question in a way that is both original and revealing.
Most of us have abandoned ourselves to objective ways of thought, and to the impersonal modes of everyday life. Usually, I do not say what I really think, nor act as I really cboose. I say the sort of thing that one would say, and do the sort of thing that one does. This is my guilt, the futile distracted being that I have been and feel myself now to be.
But man is always more than what he already is. He is also projected ahead of himself into the future, even into his last and final future. All men know that they face death. They are at least dimly aware of their final possibilities, of what they might be if they strained their capacities to the very limit. These real possibilities are not external to me, possible accretions that mayor may not be added to what I am. They belong to my ecstatic being, which cannot be compressed into a mere present. I am these real possibilities now. Conscience, indeed, is a witness to this, a communication to my lost and distracted self from, and a knowing-with (con-science), the self that I might become.
The voice of conscience is a call to me now from the distant future where I also am, calling me to become what I really am. This explains why we hear people speaking of conscience as something distant and in a certain sense alien, while at the same time admitting that nothing is more personal. My conscience is no mere ex post facto critic of this or that action already performed. It comes out of me from beyond me, calling me to total and integral existence.
My conscience is not curious. It does not have to be shown. It knows these things already. Its voice is unambiguous. We always know what it means. Yet it is chary of words, and expresses itself most forcibly by silence. It does not seek for an answer in words. I cannot argue with my conscience. Any genuine answer must take the form of real choice and decisive action, though we must remember here that thought is an essential part of any human act, and in itself, if genuine, an intensive form of action. But whatever our project may be, and however our world is organized around it, we must think it through seriously, and commit ourselves to it.
Ever since Kierkegaard, the need for final commitment has been a constant theme of existentialist thought. It has often been interpreted as a demand for blind and irrational action. But this is a misunderstanding of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the best existentialist thought. It is not directed against thought but rather against a certain type of objective thought, a thoughtless thought which is unaware of its existential roots and its human finitude. Kierkegaard has this in mind when he speaks of an acquaintance who was so detached and objective about his own affairs that in talking to him one felt he was listening not to the man himself but to a distant relative, perhaps an uncle.
Human life is certainly dangerous and filled with risk. But it is all we have. Hence by trying to detach ourselves from it, we run the additional risk of losing our existence. Furthermore, any such attempt is a hollow pretence, for in the end it is evident that even the most objective and far-reaching speculation is the finite thought of a weak and fragile individual. But why are not tentative choices enough? Why is a final commitment necessary? The existentialist answer to these questions is best understood by reflecting upon the meaning of what we call huma1 integrity or wholeness.
All the parts of a physical process can never exist all together al once. It achieves itself in successive stages. At a given moment it is nol the past and not the future, but just what it is. The cognitive being of man gives rise to a very different structure. Through what I call m) memory, I not only grow out of the past like a plant: I am now the past that I have been. The future is not merely something external that may happen to me: by self-reflection and choice I can project my future . And in so far as I do this, I am the future I am now projecting. Thus it is possible for man to achieve a new and distinctively human type of wholeness, the concentration of an integral past and integral future in a present act.
The most distinctively human acts have this sort of integrity. When confronted by them in history or in our own experience, we are impressed by the sense that in them the full force of a whole human life, future, present, and past, is being expressed. This is human existence in its most concentrated and intensive form. It may seem to occur in a single moment of critical decision. But as a matter of fact, such a moment requires a prolonged preparation and arduous discipline. Human action is always historical and rooted in the past. If integral action is to be achieved, the first step must be to accept a total responsibility for the past that I have been, with all the weakness, ugliness, and guilt that attaches to it. Then there may be a cboice which will commit me only to a certain degree, with a certain part of my being, for several days, or months, or years, after which it is replaced by otber choices. Such a life disappears into a past that is not maintained. It is lived successively like a process that runs off in time. The whole of the man is never engaged with the whole of his personality at a present moment, but only certain parts of himself that appear for an interval, and then disappear. A genuine choice commits me with the whole of my being up to the very end. Such a choice must be renewed, and, to use a term from Kierkegaard, "repeated" from day to day. Otherwise the historic structure of life disintegrates, and its powers waste away.
According to the existentialist view, this structure is closely related to human freedom of choice, which is universally accepted by all who are even peripherally associated with this school of thought. The phenomenological evidence that real choices are actually made is too abundant and unambiguous. Theories of determinism are never based on a carefnl observation of human action in the concrete. They arise rather 91 from a speculative attempt to squeeze all the rich data of experience into the abstract framework of that special, objective point of view which is appropriate for the special sciences. But when this point of view is made absolute it leads either to the neglect or to the distortion of "subjective" evidence, and ends in the reduction of the human person to a thing. All existentialist thinkers would agree to this. But neither Heidegger, Jaspers, nor Marcel would accept the extreme view of Sartre that human freedom is unlimited and finds its only possible expression in purely arbitrary preferences.
The whole of existentialist literature is saturated with a poignant sense of the fragility and contingency of man. From the time of Kierkegaard's bitter rejection of the Hegelian doctrine of an immanent absolute spirit, it has been primarily a philosophy of finitude. This finitude is to be understood not so much in terms of absent properties as of pervasive obstacles which check the power of our free existence, and whose obstructive influence is present in every act that we perform. Certain obstacles are open to objective analysis. Once understood, we may take measures against them and sometimes, by the application of scientific intelligence, overcome them one by one. Other obstacles, however, are more basic. We can understand their negative effect, but we cannot see beyond them. They tower over our action like great walls we cannot climb, and through which we can never pass. Against these, technological instruments in the end are useless. They are the final and inexorable limits of our being. Jaspers has called them boundary-situations, and has described several with penetrating clarity.
One of them is the situationality of our existence. I may analyse clearly the difficulties of my present position, make shrewd calculations, and throw myself into the task of overcoming them. But if I succeed, it is only to find myself in another situation with further obstacles to overcome. Whenever I am, whatever I do, I am always in a situation. This is an unsurpassable limit to our existence.
Another such limit is what we call chance, which can never be clearly predicted, and may always intrude at the last moment to upset the best-laid plans.
Conflict is a further limit of this sort. Though we may disguise it and try to conceal it from ourselves, it conditions our existence constantly and fundamentally. Every moment that I live deprives someone else of existence. My life is possible only through military conquests made by those who came before me. Its continuance, together with that of millions of others, now depends upon weapons of vast destructive power.
No doubt the forms of conJlict and competition may be changed. Bu to think of eliminating them entirely is to indulge in a futile dream As we have already noted, what we call guilt is another such ultimatl limit. Here again we may try to run away from it and ignore it. Bu these attempts are futile. In the end, whatever I choose, whatever I do I am still guilty.
Then there is the final limit of death, a dominant theme in the litera, ture of existentialism, beginning with Kierkegaard. In it, all the mark: of an existential limit emerge with peculiar clarity. That it is, all mer are sure. I know that I am going to die. But I cannot see clearly beyond I cannot pass through as I am. It may be postponed and pushed bac! by medical science, but in the end such measures are futile. It looms ove) me as an inexorable and inscrutable wall about which I can do nothing It is true that technical measures and manipulations are helples: against such limits. In this sense nothing can be done. But there i: another sense in which everything can be done. To reflect upon thest boundaries seriously is to raise the ultimate questions of our existence The way we face them reveals the kind of being we are, for the way , finite being holds itself with respect to its ultimate limits is the vefJ core of that being. Even an unconscious thing becomes diluted am confused when its limits are confused. But to be aware belongs to th. being of man. Hence to become evasive or confused about these limits i: to confuse our existence at its very core. As Jaspers says: "Authenti, existence is possible only in the light of these ultimate boundaries."
III
The preponderant attention which has been paid to the literary ane philosophical works of Sartre has helped to spread the impression tha' existentialist ethics is altogether relativistic and rests exclusively on ar unfounded and irrational choice. These epithets, however, apply ever to Sartre ouly with a serious qualification, and to other serious thinker: of this school not at all. Any articulate view of the nature of man i: bound to have implications for action, and as we have tried to suggest the different existentialist thinkers have begun to develop a view of mar which has many common features as well as a striking historic novelty This view carries with it ethical implications of a definitely non-relativisti, kind.
A basic reason for this misunderstanding lies in the fact that tradi, tional ethics from Greek philosophy down to Kant has been interestee primarily in formulating a theory of virtues, or kinds of act that need te be performed if the essence of man, a kind of being, is to be realized. The existentialists on the other hand are not so much concerned with the abstract essence of man as with the existence which brings it into act. No matter what kind of thing we think or do, the act may be performed in an unsound way. The moral question raised by these thinkers, therefore, is not so much the traditional formula, what should I do? as how shall I do it. One may certainly question whether this last is the only moral question to be raised, but it wonld be absurd to deny that it is of basic importance. In addition to essentialist values (kinds of act) there are existential values as well (modes of action). In this field, the existential doctrine is original and far from relativistic, though we shall have time for only a brief comment on three such existential values that have already been touched upon.
The first is the value of existential thought. Neither Kierkegaard nor any of his living followers has denied that true information about man and human and sub-human structures may be attained by the application of the detached, objective attitude which is characteristic of science. Such an attitude abstracts from its own existence, and loses itself in the objects with which it is concerned. This does not mean that it is necessarily misleading. It matters a great deal how it is done. If it retains a germ of self-consciousness, remembering that it is after all only one attitude among many others, that the objects and laws which it abstractly focuses are pervaded by an ocean of existence which includes vast ranges of non-objective data as well, then it will be done in a spirit of harmless humility.
But if it loses itself completely in the objects it sees, regarding these Objects as all there is, and trying finally to fit itself and human existence as such into this field of abstractions, then it will be done in a spirit of objective pride which must lead to terrible distortions, and ultimately to the dehumanization of man. The world of human existence can never be fitted into the universe of objects that have been abstracted from it. A mode of detached thought that tries to do this, because it is unaware of is own existence, can never be authentic.
Freedom is not a property of man nor any set of properties. Hence it has been in general neglected and never subjected to sufficiently searching analyses by classical philosophy. As a matter of fact, it is a way of existing which, in its various modes authentic and unauthentic, pervades everything we think and do. It is intensely personal and can never be understood by objective categories. A free act grows out of anxiety and responds to the call of the conscience. I perform it out of myself and my own thoughts and choices. I lose it in so far as I allow myself to be passively swayed by objects and forces external to me. Even the best kind of act may be performed in a non-spontaneous and impersonal way, which, to this degree, must deprive it of possible value. Sartre's view of an unrestricted human freedom is certainly false. As Heidegger says, men are thrown into the world. They did not choose to be born. But by choosing to accept themselves as they are, with all their limitations, men may open themselves to a limited freedom which may give a new tone to the whole of life.
The third existential value, integrity, we have already considered in another connection. We need only add here that it is certainly not a property or any set of properties, but rather a total structure pervading all that I think or do in a mode that is either authentic or unauthentic. The classical tradition conceived of it as a timeless whole of virtues (qualities) arranged in a hierarchical order. But while the human essence and its properties may be timeless, the act of existing is temporal. Hence human integrity can be achieved only by an ecstatic mode of existing which holds to its past, projects itself into a final future, and concentrates them both in a present act, all together at once. This novel conception has many moral implications. In contemporary books on ethics, for example, it is rare to find any careful consideration of human temporality, historicity, anxiety, and death. In view of the new light that has now been shed on these important topics, it is difficult to see how any informed ethics of the future can avoid them.
Is there anything radically new about this philosophy? If we take account of the best existentialist writings, such as Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Marcel's Metaphysical Journal, Jaspers's Philosophie, and Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, an affirmative answer must be given.
It is a serious mistake to suppose that this philosophy is subjectivistic in the sense that human cognition distorts reality, and cannot know it as it is. On the contrary, these philosophers all hold that being, and especially human being, can be known as it is. In this they agree with classical realism, and have continued its intensive quest for being. But they are no longer content with essentialist analysis and its timeless abstractions. In place of this, they have discovered new ways of access to personal existence.
It is equally mistaken to suppose that this philosophy is objectivistic in holding that the being of the knower may be ignored or adequately known as an object among other objects. On the contrary, these philosophers hold that the personal existence of the knower can never be known as an object among other objects. In this, they agree with modem idealism and have continued its search for the transcendental self. But they are no longer content with transcendental spirits which float through the world, and constitute it from beyond. In place of this, they have discovered that the transcendental self is an aspect of the concrete person, namely his existence.
There is a sense, therefore, in which this is a radically new philosophy beyond both idealism and realism. It is a living mode of thought that applies to the problems of living men, and expresses their implicit feeling for life and their place in human history. In its profounder manifestations, as in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, it has achieved insights the significance of which will probably extend far beyond our own time and place in history.
